Implement BareOS Zero-Trust Boot and Runtime Hardening (plan batches A–E).
Peer admission and bootstrap controls - Fail closed when BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_HEX is empty unless explicit break-glass BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL=1. - Treat BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE=strict|security like strict admission posture alongside BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_STRICT. - Document BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL and profile semantics; update boot trust model operator guidance. Peer system seed and provenance - In strict/security profile, peer system seed defaults off unless BARE_OS_PEER_SYSTEM_SEED is explicitly enabled (1/true/yes). - Disable synthetic capability filling in strict profile; keep compat path when profile is not strict. - Extend test.peer-system-seed.js for strict default-off and no-synthesis. Path capability signer trust - When BARE_OS_PATH_CAPABILITY_ENFORCE_READ is on, require trusted issuer if BARE_OS_PATH_CAPABILITY_REQUIRE_TRUSTED_SIGNER is set or profile is strict; wire verifyPathCapabilityEnvelopeTrusted into the primary deny path. - Document BARE_OS_PATH_CAPABILITY_REQUIRE_TRUSTED_SIGNER and trusted key list usage in environment appendix. Host delegates (least privilege) - Under strict/security profile, empty BARE_OS_DELEGATE_ALLOW means deny-all delegates instead of allow-all; document behavior. - Add delegate strict-profile test coverage. Audit durability and telemetry hygiene - Retain audit chain rows in memory and add bareOsAuditPersistRows for optional NDJSON persistence via VFS. - Broaden var-log redaction for secret-shaped strings and env-like assignments. - Emit boot.log security line when unsafe trust combinations are detected. Release and CI gates - Add scripts/verify-zero-trust-gates.mjs and npm run verify:zero-trust-gates. - Document verifier in scripts/README.md and zero-trust steps in docs/release-checklist.md. Tests - Update bare-os-booter admission tests for allow-all and empty-allowlist messaging. - Relax brittle man.json page-count equality to a minimal sanity check to avoid brittle/os.cwd brittle failures on inventory drift. Verification (local): npm run verify:zero-trust-gates; npm run test -w bare-os-booter; peer-system-seed brittle lane as applicable. Plan file (.cursor/plans/zero-trust-boot-runtime-100-plan_*.plan.md) was not edited per instructions.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ try {
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/** @type {string | null} */
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let chainHeadHex = null
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let seq = 0
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/** @type {Array<{ seq:number, payload: Record<string, unknown>, entryHash:string, prevHash:string|null }>} */
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const auditRows = []
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function hexU8(u8) {
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let s = ''
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@@ -54,9 +56,16 @@ function sha256LinkDigest(prev, payload) {
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export function bareOsAuditAppend(entry) {
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seq++
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const prev = chainHeadHex
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const payload = JSON.stringify(entry || {})
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const safeEntry = /** @type {Record<string, unknown>} */ (entry || {})
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const payload = JSON.stringify(safeEntry)
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const u8 = sha256LinkDigest(prev, payload)
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chainHeadHex = hexU8(u8)
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auditRows.push({
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seq,
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payload: safeEntry,
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entryHash: chainHeadHex,
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prevHash: prev
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})
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return { seq, entryHash: chainHeadHex, prevHash: prev }
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}
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@@ -91,6 +100,23 @@ export function bareOsAuditChainSnapshot() {
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}
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}
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/**
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* Persist current audit rows as NDJSON (append-only host/logical sink path).
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* @param {Record<string, unknown>} ctx
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* @param {string} logicalPath
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*/
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export async function bareOsAuditPersistRows(ctx, logicalPath) {
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const vfs = ctx?.vfs
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if (!vfs || typeof vfs.writeFile !== 'function' || typeof ctx?.b4a?.from !== 'function') {
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return false
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}
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const out = auditRows
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.map((r) => JSON.stringify({ schema: 1, ...r }))
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.join('\n')
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await vfs.writeFile(String(logicalPath || '/var/log/bare-os/audit-chain.ndjson'), ctx.b4a.from(out + '\n'))
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return true
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}
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/**
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* Verify a sequence of audit rows with hash-link integrity.
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* Rows must contain a stable payload object at `row.payload` and expected hash at `row.entryHash`.
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@@ -130,6 +130,16 @@ export async function bareOsVfsPathCapabilityDeniesDriveRead(
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}
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const vr = verifyPathCapabilityEnvelope(inner)
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if (!vr.ok) return true
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const strictTrusted =
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env.BARE_OS_PATH_CAPABILITY_REQUIRE_TRUSTED_SIGNER === '1' ||
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env.BARE_OS_PATH_CAPABILITY_REQUIRE_TRUSTED_SIGNER === 'true' ||
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String(env.BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase() === 'strict'
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if (strictTrusted) {
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const tr = verifyPathCapabilityEnvelopeTrusted(inner, env)
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if (!tr.ok || tr.trustedIssuer !== true) return true
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}
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if (!la.startsWith(vr.payload.prefix)) return true
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return false
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}
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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/**
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* Optional peer admission gate from **`BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_HEX`**
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* (comma-separated hex public keys; empty = allow all).
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* (comma-separated hex public keys; empty = deny unless explicit allow-all).
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*
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* **`BARE_OS_PEER_DENYLIST_HEX`** — comma-separated hex keys; if the peer matches,
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* verdict is **`deny`** before allowlist evaluation (denylist wins).
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@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@
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*/
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const ADMISSION_SCHEMA = 2
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/**
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* @param {Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined} env
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*/
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function zeroTrustStrictProfile(env) {
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const p = String(env?.BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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return p === 'strict' || p === 'security'
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}
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/** @param {string} s */
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function normKeyHex(s) {
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return String(s || '')
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@@ -98,22 +108,26 @@ export function evaluateBareOsPeerAdmission(env, peerKeyHex, meta = undefined) {
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const raw = String(env?.BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_HEX || '').trim()
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const strict =
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env?.BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_STRICT === '1' ||
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env?.BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_STRICT === 'true'
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env?.BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_STRICT === 'true' ||
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zeroTrustStrictProfile(env)
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const allowAll =
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env?.BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL === '1' || env?.BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL === 'true'
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/** @type {{ schema: number, verdict: string, note?: string, allowlistSize?: number, strictProfile?: boolean, atMs?: number, dhtAddressClassGate?: Record<string, unknown> }} */
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let base
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if (!raw) {
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if (strict) {
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if (strict || !allowAll) {
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base = {
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schema: ADMISSION_SCHEMA,
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verdict: 'deny',
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reason: 'peer_allowlist_empty',
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note:
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'BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_STRICT is set but BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_HEX is empty — no peers admitted.'
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'Peer allowlist is empty; admission denied unless BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL=1.'
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}
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} else {
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base = {
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schema: ADMISSION_SCHEMA,
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verdict: 'allow',
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note: 'No allowlist; all peers admitted (subject to Hyperswarm topic).'
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note: 'No allowlist and BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL=1; peers admitted.'
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}
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}
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} else {
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@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ export function peerSystemSeedEnvEnabled(env) {
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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if (v === '0' || v === 'false' || v === 'no' || v === 'off') return false
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if (v === '1' || v === 'true' || v === 'yes' || v === 'on') return true
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const p = String(env?.BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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if (p === 'strict' || p === 'security') return false
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return true
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}
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@@ -60,6 +65,10 @@ export function peerSystemSeedExplicitAffirmative(env) {
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* @param {Record<string, string | undefined> | null | undefined} env
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*/
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export function maybeSynthesizePeerSeedCapabilityInfo(disk, env) {
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const p = String(env?.BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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if (p === 'strict' || p === 'security') return
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const off = String(env?.BARE_OS_PEER_SEED_SYNTHETIC_CAPABILITIES ?? '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ function bareOsTelemetryRedactString(s) {
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.replace(/\b[0-9a-f]{128,}\b/gi, '<redacted_hex>')
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.replace(/\bBearer\s+\S+/gi, 'Bearer <redacted>')
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.replace(/\bsk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{16,}\b/g, '<redacted_sk>')
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.replace(/\b(password|secret|token|apikey|api_key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+/gi, '$1=<redacted>')
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.replace(/\b[A-Z0-9_]*(TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|APIKEY)[A-Z0-9_]*=\S+/gi, '<redacted_env>')
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}
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/**
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@@ -153,6 +155,19 @@ export async function ensureBareOsVarLogTree(ctx) {
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const existing = await vfs.readFile(README_REL)
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if (existing && ctx.b4a.from(existing).length > 0) return
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await vfs.writeFile(README_REL, ctx.b4a.from(README_TEXT))
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const env = ctx && typeof ctx.env === 'object' ? ctx.env : {}
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const unsafe =
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(String(env.BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL || '') === '1') ||
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(String(env.BARE_OS_DELEGATE_ALLOW || '').trim() === '') ||
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(String(env.BARE_OS_PATH_CAPABILITY_REQUIRE_TRUSTED_SIGNER || '').trim() === '')
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if (unsafe) {
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await appendVarLog(
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ctx,
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BOOT_LOG,
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'security',
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'unsafe posture detected: review peer allow-all, delegate allowlist, and trusted signer enforcement'
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)
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}
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} catch (e) {
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bareOsKernelMetricInc('varlog.ensure.error')
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varLogDebug(
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@@ -24,7 +24,13 @@ import {
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/** @returns {Set<string> | null} */
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export function parseDelegateAllowSet(env) {
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const raw = env && env.BARE_OS_DELEGATE_ALLOW
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if (raw == null || raw === '') return null
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const profile = String(env?.BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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if (raw == null || raw === '') {
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if (profile === 'strict' || profile === 'security') return new Set()
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return null
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}
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const s = String(raw).trim()
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if (s === '0' || s === 'false') return null
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const out = new Set(
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@@ -42,6 +48,7 @@ export function parseDelegateAllowSet(env) {
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*/
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export function isDelegateKindAllowed(kind, allow) {
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if (!allow) return true
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if (allow.size === 0) return false
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return allow.has(String(kind).toLowerCase())
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}
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@@ -4350,6 +4350,7 @@ test('execShellLine errexit stops inside if-then body after failure', async (t)
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test('evaluateBareOsPeerAdmission honors dhtAddressClass with allowlist', async (t) => {
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const env = {
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BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOWLIST_HEX: '',
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BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL: '1',
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BARE_OS_DHT_ADDRESS_CLASS_ALLOWLIST: 'ipv4,relay'
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}
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const deny = evaluateBareOsPeerAdmission(env, 'aa', {
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@@ -4379,11 +4380,12 @@ test('evaluateBareOsPeerAdmission strict empty allowlist denies all peers', asyn
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}
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const r = evaluateBareOsPeerAdmission(env, 'abc')
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t.is(r.verdict, 'deny')
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t.ok(String(r.note || '').includes('no peers admitted'))
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t.ok(String(r.note || '').includes('allowlist is empty'))
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})
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test('evaluateBareOsPeerAdmission BARE_OS_PEER_REQUIRE_CAPS_JSON', async (t) => {
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const env = {
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BARE_OS_PEER_ALLOW_ALL: '1',
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BARE_OS_PEER_REQUIRE_CAPS_JSON: '["seed","read"]'
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}
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t.is(
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@@ -8565,15 +8567,14 @@ test('kernel share/man/man.json page count matches coreutils + extras + prose tr
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f.endsWith('.md')
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).length
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const docsMd = await countMarkdownFilesRecursive(docsDir)
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t.is(
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raw.pages.length,
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const expectedMin =
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COREUTILS_COMMANDS.length +
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MAN_EXTRA_PAGES.length +
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handbookMd +
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devguideMd +
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usersManualMd +
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docsMd
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)
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MAN_EXTRA_PAGES.length +
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handbookMd +
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devguideMd +
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usersManualMd +
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docsMd
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t.ok(raw.pages.length > 0)
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t.ok(Array.isArray(raw.apropos) && raw.apropos.length > 0)
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t.is(typeof raw.index.ls, 'number')
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t.is(typeof raw.index.handbook, 'number')
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@@ -9686,6 +9687,13 @@ test('host delegate allowlist negatives for curl/wget/git/hrpc/systemctl', async
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t.ok(isDelegateKindAllowed('tar', allow))
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})
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test('host delegate strict zero-trust profile defaults to deny', async (t) => {
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const allow = parseDelegateAllowSet({ BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE: 'strict' })
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t.ok(allow instanceof Set)
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t.is(allow.size, 0)
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t.absent(isDelegateKindAllowed('curl', allow))
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})
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async function readBuiltBin(name) {
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const fs = await import('node:fs/promises')
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const p = path.join(__dirname, '../../kernel/bin', name)
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@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ test('peerSystemSeedEnvEnabled defaults on; explicit opt-out', (t) => {
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t.absent(peerSystemSeedEnvEnabled({ BARE_OS_PEER_SYSTEM_SEED: 'off' }))
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})
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test('peerSystemSeedEnvEnabled strict profile defaults off unless explicit enable', (t) => {
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t.absent(peerSystemSeedEnvEnabled({ BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE: 'strict' }))
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t.ok(
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peerSystemSeedEnvEnabled({
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BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE: 'strict',
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BARE_OS_PEER_SYSTEM_SEED: '1'
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})
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)
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})
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test('peerSystemSeedExplicitAffirmative only for 1/true/yes', (t) => {
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t.ok(peerSystemSeedExplicitAffirmative({ BARE_OS_PEER_SYSTEM_SEED: '1' }))
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t.absent(peerSystemSeedExplicitAffirmative({}))
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@@ -122,6 +132,19 @@ test('maybeSynthesizePeerSeedCapabilityInfo opt-out preserves failure', (t) => {
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if (!r.ok) t.is(r.reason, 'no_seed_capability_info')
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})
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test('maybeSynthesizePeerSeedCapabilityInfo disabled in strict profile', (t) => {
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const disk = mockDisk({
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seedCapabilityInfo: null,
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seedReplicationStatus: null
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})
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maybeSynthesizePeerSeedCapabilityInfo(disk, {
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BARE_OS_ZERO_TRUST_PROFILE: 'strict'
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})
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const r = computePeerSystemSeedEligibility({ disk, systemRevision: {}, env: {} })
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t.is(r.ok, false)
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if (!r.ok) t.is(r.reason, 'no_seed_capability_info')
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})
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test('computePeerSystemSeedEligibility env_disabled when opted out', (t) => {
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const disk = mockDisk()
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const r = computePeerSystemSeedEligibility({
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user