Secure connections with AutoPass invites, HMAC capabilities, and viewer default.

Default peers are read-only; admin requires seed proof and operators redeem AutoPass packages with signed grants. ACL UI and docs match the new trust model.

test/crypto-auth.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+import test from 'brittle'
+import crypto from 'crypto'
+import {
+  deriveMacKey,
+  signCapability,
+  verifyCapability,
+  createAdminProof,
+  verifyAdminProof,
+  classifyConnectionInput,
+  safeEqual,
+} from '../shared/crypto-auth.js'
+import { Roles } from '../shared/protocol.js'
+
+const SEED = 'ab'.repeat(32)
+const SEED2 = 'cd'.repeat(32)
+const PEER = '11'.repeat(32)
+const SERVER_PK = '22'.repeat(32)
+
+test('deriveMacKey is deterministic and differs by seed', (t) => {
+  const a = deriveMacKey(SEED)
+  const b = deriveMacKey(SEED)
+  const c = deriveMacKey(SEED2)
+  t.is(a.length, 32)
+  t.ok(safeEqual(a, b))
+  t.absent(safeEqual(a, c))
+})
+
+test('sign and verify capability', (t) => {
+  const { token, payload } = signCapability(SEED, {
+    role: Roles.operator,
+    ttlMs: 3600_000,
+  })
+  t.ok(token.includes('.'))
+  t.is(payload.role, Roles.operator)
+  const res = verifyCapability(SEED, token, { peerId: PEER })
+  t.ok(res.ok)
+  t.is(res.payload.role, Roles.operator)
+  t.ok(res.payload.jti)
+})
+
+test('tampered capability fails', (t) => {
+  const { token } = signCapability(SEED, { role: Roles.admin, ttlMs: 3600_000 })
+  const [body, mac] = token.split('.')
+  // Flip last char of body (base64url)
+  const flipped =
+    body.slice(0, -1) + (body.endsWith('A') ? 'B' : 'A') + '.' + mac
+  const res = verifyCapability(SEED, flipped)
+  t.absent(res.ok)
+  t.is(res.code, 'CAPABILITY_INVALID')
+})
+
+test('wrong seed fails verify', (t) => {
+  const { token } = signCapability(SEED, { role: Roles.operator, ttlMs: 3600_000 })
+  const res = verifyCapability(SEED2, token)
+  t.absent(res.ok)
+  t.is(res.code, 'CAPABILITY_INVALID')
+})
+
+test('expired capability fails', (t) => {
+  const { token } = signCapability(SEED, { role: Roles.viewer, ttlMs: 60_000 })
+  const res = verifyCapability(SEED, token, { now: Date.now() + 120_000 })
+  t.absent(res.ok)
+  t.is(res.code, 'CAPABILITY_EXPIRED')
+})
+
+test('peer-bound capability mismatch', (t) => {
+  const { token } = signCapability(SEED, {
+    role: Roles.operator,
+    ttlMs: 3600_000,
+    peerId: PEER,
+  })
+  const bad = verifyCapability(SEED, token, { peerId: '33'.repeat(32) })
+  t.absent(bad.ok)
+  t.is(bad.code, 'CAPABILITY_PEER_MISMATCH')
+  const good = verifyCapability(SEED, token, { peerId: PEER })
+  t.ok(good.ok)
+})
+
+test('spent jti check', (t) => {
+  const { token, payload } = signCapability(SEED, { role: Roles.operator, ttlMs: 3600_000 })
+  const spent = new Set([payload.jti])
+  const res = verifyCapability(SEED, token, {
+    allowSpentCheck: (jti) => !spent.has(jti),
+  })
+  t.absent(res.ok)
+  t.is(res.code, 'CAPABILITY_SPENT')
+})
+
+test('admin proof round-trip', (t) => {
+  const proof = createAdminProof(SEED, {
+    peerId: PEER,
+    serverPublicKeyHex: SERVER_PK,
+  })
+  t.ok(proof.nonce)
+  t.ok(proof.mac)
+  const ok = verifyAdminProof(SEED, proof, {
+    peerId: PEER,
+    serverPublicKeyHex: SERVER_PK,
+  })
+  t.ok(ok.ok)
+  const bad = verifyAdminProof(SEED2, proof, {
+    peerId: PEER,
+    serverPublicKeyHex: SERVER_PK,
+  })
+  t.absent(bad.ok)
+  t.is(bad.code, 'ADMIN_PROOF_FAILED')
+})
+
+test('classifyConnectionInput', (t) => {
+  t.is(classifyConnectionInput(SERVER_PK), 'publicKey')
+  t.is(classifyConnectionInput('aa'.repeat(24)), 'legacyInvite')
+  t.is(classifyConnectionInput('ynr' + 'a'.repeat(100)), 'autopassInvite')
+  t.is(classifyConnectionInput('not-valid'), 'unknown')
+  t.is(classifyConnectionInput(''), 'unknown')
+})
+
+test('safeEqual length mismatch', (t) => {
+  t.absent(safeEqual(Buffer.from('ab'), Buffer.from('abc')))
+  t.ok(safeEqual(crypto.randomBytes(0), Buffer.alloc(0)))
+})